USSR invades Ukraine. (23 Viewers)

shmmeee

Well-Known Member
The citizens of Baghdad may disagree. One big multinational show off of firepower. Death of innocents is still death of innocents

The US did not retaliate out of rage and did not intentionally target civilians.

Russia was not attempting to end the war quickly by overwhelming force, regardless of whether that’s a good idea on its own.
 

Macca

Well-Known Member
The US did not retaliate out of rage and did not intentionally target civilians.

Russia was not attempting to end the war quickly by overwhelming force, regardless of whether that’s a good idea on its own.

It’s a poor excuse for me. You drop that much hardware on a densely populated city and you are by nature intentionally targeting civilians. Moral outrage from the West is difficult to swallow
 

Kieranp96

Well-Known Member
It’s a poor excuse for me. You drop that much hardware on a densely populated city and you are by nature intentionally targeting civilians. Moral outrage from the West is difficult to swallow
Whataboutism loads of bollocks, what happened 10/15 years ago don’t justify what’s happening now.
 

PVA

Well-Known Member


Is this real?


Seems to have been done on one occasion for a particular reason.

 

shmmeee

Well-Known Member
It’s a poor excuse for me. You drop that much hardware on a densely populated city and you are by nature intentionally targeting civilians. Moral outrage from the West is difficult to swallow

Two wrongs make a right is pretty hard to swallow too TBH. I’m not sure how dragging up US in Iraq is at all relevant here. Do you think Iraq was a good thing? And so is what Russia are doing?
 

Macca

Well-Known Member
Two wrongs make a right is pretty hard to swallow too TBH. I’m not sure how dragging up US in Iraq is at all relevant here. Do you think Iraq was a good thing? And so is what Russia are doing?

In short.
They don’t. You miss my point. No. No.

Russian actions are despicable, but the moral outrage of Western Leaders who are only ever 2 mins away from leaping at the chance to chuck some hi tech weapons at anyone slightly dusky, is a bit too much to swallow
 

tisza

Well-Known Member
So Musk upset by forthright response from Ukraine to his suggestion that they should consider ceding territory to Russia.
Buys Twitter as he says it was suppressing free speech.
Yet prepared to encourage the enlargement of a country where anti-govt media is suppressed and govt opposition can land you in prison.
 

tisza

Well-Known Member
Nice try Vlad



Key issue as it also raises the subject of what can be done to protect Ukraine's long-term security.
If it's not NATO membership then what other options are there? NATO membership is provocative but what else is there? Russia promises not to invade again? Russian promises not worth anything as they repeatedly said last winter/this spring they weren't going to invade.
Any sort of ceasefire would allow Russia to rearm and regroup and (having learnt from their mistakes) reattack. Ukraine needs to maximize this period for advancing, consolidating gains etc before the heavy winter really sets in.
 

shmmeee

Well-Known Member
Iranian drones battering Kiev again, seems like a real problem, the cost £30k a piece and you use middles costing £100s of thousands to take them down. And even then they send so many you can’t shoot them all down.

No sanctions for Iran cos everyone’s waiting to see if there’s a revolution.

I wonder if the Russian plan isn’t to flood the front lines with cannon fodder, then batter cities with drones until Ukraine agrees to “peace talks” (capitulation)
 

CCFCSteve

Well-Known Member
Key issue as it also raises the subject of what can be done to protect Ukraine's long-term security.
If it's not NATO membership then what other options are there? NATO membership is provocative but what else is there? Russia promises not to invade again? Russian promises not worth anything as they repeatedly said last winter/this spring they weren't going to invade.
Any sort of ceasefire would allow Russia to rearm and regroup and (having learnt from their mistakes) reattack. Ukraine needs to maximize this period for advancing, consolidating gains etc before the heavy winter really sets in.

This has been discussed as a likely part of Putins plan for a while. There was talk of the west providing Ukraine with a security guarantee as part of any ceasefire. Risky if Putin then comes back with his new army next year, as we’d have to intervene, but let’s be honest, it will have to come to a head at some stage. Also, would Russia accept our security guarantee as part of ceasefire ? Would flush out his intentions at least
 

PVA

Well-Known Member
This has been discussed as a likely part of Putins plan for a while. There was talk of the west providing Ukraine with a security guarantee as part of any ceasefire. Risky if Putin then comes back with his new army next year, as we’d have to intervene, but let’s be honest, it will have to come to a head at some stage. Also, would Russia accept our security guarantee as part of ceasefire ? Would flush out his intentions at least

They won't have a new army for many years to come.

Or to put it more accurately, they won't have an effective army for many years to come.
 

chiefdave

Well-Known Member
Report on the BBC at the weekend that they're going into public places and literally rounding up people to send to Ukraine to fight. Not sure that's going to give them a particularly competent army even if they hold off for now and give them 6 months training with a view to going back in next spring.

The options don't look great for Putin. How does he extract himself from this mess without looking weak?
 

Otis

Well-Known Member
Report on the BBC at the weekend that they're going into public places and literally rounding up people to send to Ukraine to fight. Not sure that's going to give them a particularly competent army even if they hold off for now and give them 6 months training with a view to going back in next spring.

The options don't look great for Putin. How does he extract himself from this mess without looking weak?
Maybe he needs to do this again.

download (5).jpeg
 

tisza

Well-Known Member
This has been discussed as a likely part of Putins plan for a while. There was talk of the west providing Ukraine with a security guarantee as part of any ceasefire. Risky if Putin then comes back with his new army next year, as we’d have to intervene, but let’s be honest, it will have to come to a head at some stage. Also, would Russia accept our security guarantee as part of ceasefire ? Would flush out his intentions at least
Putin can't accept this. He argues the former Eastern bloc countries shouldn't be in NATO and that potential Ukrainian memberhip of NATO was a cause of this war.
Ukraine can't accept neutrality as they can't trust Russia going forward.
There's already a big issue of Russia creating majority populations in areas of Ukraine either by refugee movement, forced deportations and moving native Russians into these new areas. This is exactly what happened in Donbas & Luhansk - that were pretty much 50/50 before 2014.
Russia would be better prepared next time around and if the "blitzkrieg" on Kiev worked then it would be pretty much a fait accompli
 

CCFCSteve

Well-Known Member
Putin can't accept this. He argues the former Eastern bloc countries shouldn't be in NATO and that potential Ukrainian memberhip of NATO was a cause of this war.
Ukraine can't accept neutrality as they can't trust Russia going forward.
There's already a big issue of Russia creating majority populations in areas of Ukraine either by refugee movement, forced deportations and moving native Russians into these new areas. This is exactly what happened in Donbas & Luhansk - that were pretty much 50/50 before 2014.
Russia would be better prepared next time around and if the "blitzkrieg" on Kiev worked then it would be pretty much a fait accompli

Unlikely a ceasefire can happen then I guess.
 

CCFCSteve

Well-Known Member
They won't have a new army for many years to come.

Or to put it more accurately, they won't have an effective army for many years to come.

Yeah, that’s why I was calling it ‘his new army’…let’s be honest it will be an under prepared, unmotivated rabble
 
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skybluetony176

Well-Known Member
Apparently Russia has “evacuated” the population along a river in Russian occupied Ukraine claiming that the Ukrainian army are going to hit a nearby damn and flood the area. Some suggestion that it’s a ruse to keep hold of Ukrainian civilians as the Ukrainian army advances in the region. Big worry is that it’s a set up for a false flag attack that the Russians will then claim to be an act of terrorism.
 

Flying Fokker

Well-Known Member
So, RT.com. The Russian keyboard warriors in the comments section are as Jingoistic as we are. A lot of antisemetism as well. They genuinely believe they are winning the Special Operation. Every defeat is part of a cunning plan. The article:

Sergey Poletaev: As winter approaches, both Russia and Ukraine bulk up their forces in preparation for decisive battles
Moscow’s military mobilization means that Kiev is set to lose its vast numerical advantage. How will this play out on the battlefields?
By Sergey Poletaev, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project.
FILE PHOTO. © Wolfgang Schwan / Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
Russia’s failures on the frontlines of its conflict with Ukraine in September were followed by organizational conclusions: A partial mobilization was announced on September 21; on October 8, all Russian forces in Ukraine were united under General Sergey Surovikin; and on October 19, a kind of defense committee headed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin was created and elements of martial law were introduced in a number of western and southern regions.
The effect of these measures, however, has yet to manifest itself, so since early autumn, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have had the initiative on almost the entire front, except in the area of Artyomovsk (Bakhmut) in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), where the Wagner Group’s forces have continued their leisurely offensive.
As we anticipated, in the north of the front, at the junction of Kharkov Region and the DPR, the enemy built upon its September success, and by the start of October, had taken the strategically important town of Krasny Liman, which had fallen under Russian control back in May.
Although the Ukrainian army’s offensive stalled and the Russians managed to counterattack and liberate several settlements afterwards, the event was symbolic. For the first time, not just a major city, but a Russian city was surrendered to the enemy – on the very day after the four new regions were incorporated into our country.

On the Kherson front, after a month of bloody failures, Kiev’s forces eventually unlocked the Russian defenses. The direction of the main strike shifted to the northeast, where a strike was launched on October 2-4 along the Dnieperriverbank, forcing Russian troops to retreat 20-30km to the Dudchany-Davydov Brod line. Again, the same tactics used in Kharkov worked: Taking advantage of the numerical edge and the fact that Moscow did not have a solid front but rather a number of garrisons on the line. The Ukrainians broke through to the rear, flooded the area, and forced a Russian retreat.
For the Ukrainians, this style of attack is a double-edged sword: If successful, it means a very quick breakthrough; but if unsuccessful, it leads to very heavy losses.
Since then, the front has been stabilized, but the position of the Russians here remains vulnerable. All supplies for the group, and the regional center, depend on road transport via the Kakhovskaya Dam, which has been subjected to missile attacks by Kiev on more than one occasion. Temporary military bridges have been erected to replace the broken passes over the sluice, which itself has been backfilled to allow passage, but this does not fully solve the supply problem.
At dawn on October 8, there was a high-profile attack on the Crimean Bridge – a truck bomb was detonated, collapsing one of the two roads, and a parallel train carrying oil products caught fire, damaging one of the railway lines. The surviving lanes were restored to road traffic on the same day, while the rest required major repairs.
With this act of sabotage, as well as his calls for a preemptive nuclear strike, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky gave his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, an excuse to up the ante. Russia responded by launching massive strikes on Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure. This was the first time since the beginning of the military operation that systematic work of this nature was seen. According to various estimates, in less than two weeks of daily attacks, Ukraine’s power grid deteriorated by 10-30%. A strict regime of light saving was introduced across the country, as water supplies, street lighting, and electric transport were cut off to varying degrees. So far, only thermal power plants, their electrical substations, and power grid control rooms have been attacked. Hydropower plants, for example, much less nuclear power plants, have not been targeted.

In addition to Kalibr cruise missiles, Geran-2 kamikaze drones have been widely used in the strikes. They are equipped with a simple piston engine (for which they are nicknamed ‘mopeds’) and use a satellite guidance system. Because of their mass application and the lack of a jet stream at which anti-aircraft missile heads can be aimed, Ukrainian air defence is powerless against the Gerans: it is more often possible to shoot down a drone with small arms as it approaches its target, which, in turn, leads to explosives-laden drones dropping on civilian objects, residential buildings and so on in dense urban areas.
Ukraine has responded by stepping up the shelling of Belgorod Region, also targeting electrical substations. This has caused power outages in Belgorod, which, however, cannot be compared to the blackouts in Ukraine.
In addition, Kiev has started targeting power centers in the new Russian regions– in recent days, facilities in Donetsk and Energodar have been hit.
Western reactions to Moscow’s latest actions have been surprisingly sluggish. In response to the acceptance of new regions into Russia, the partial mobilization, and strikes on the energy sector, Washington only promised to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses to combat Kalibrs and Gerans. Accelerated accession to NATO was not offered, nor was a sharp increase in arms deliveries. Thus, it is clear that the West intends to continue fighting by proxy – at least as long as the offensive potential of the AFU remains.
***
So what’s next? It appears that Kiev is preparing a major offensive on Kherson with the aim of taking both the city itself and the entire right bank part of the region. General Surovikin has openly admitted the gravity of the situation, not ruling out “difficult decisions.” In recent days, Russia has been conducting a hasty evacuation of the right bank, and it appears that the main battle of the autumn is about to begin here.
In addition, we should expect an attack by the AFU in the north, in Svatovo and Rubezhnoye-Severodonetsk. A large Ukrainian grouping has also assembled in the area, and the Russian Armed Forces are actively setting up defensive lines.

Another area under threat is Energodar and the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant. New attempts at landing via the Kakhovka Reservoir and an overland strike via Vasilievka along the southern bank of the Dnieper can be expected here, but the latter does not appear to be realistic at the moment.
Ukraine needs to hurry. Time is working against it. As mobilized troops from Russia arrive at the front, the AFU’s advantage in numbers will come to an end and the tactic of breaking through with light units will no longer work. In addition, in November, the last of the green grass will vanish, snow will fall, and the troops will become more vulnerable from the air.
Russia will apparently continue its strikes on infrastructure while reinforcing the front. The immediate task is to repel an offensive by the AFU, inflicting maximum defensive damage. A joint Russian-Belarusian grouping in Belarus has also been announced. It can hardly be expected to launch an offensive from the north, but instead, its aim is probably to draw in as many Ukrainian forces as possible from the front to cover the border.
Kiev seems to be well aware of the limits of its capabilities, as in recent days, there have been reports of new waves of mobilization in Ukraine. Whether Russia will have to respond in the same manner, or whether the first autumn draft will be enough, we will see in the coming months.
 

PVA

Well-Known Member
Seems like it is just a meatgrinder for the Russians now, not unexpectedly.

As many as 3,000 apparently killed in the last 4 days.
 

tisza

Well-Known Member
Seems like it is just a meatgrinder for the Russians now, not unexpectedly.

As many as 3,000 apparently killed in the last 4 days.
just using ill-equipped conscripts as cannon fodder - reminiscent of WW1 theories in bodies vs metres held etc. There will come a domestic tipping point for Russia if these losses continue at such a rate
 

Alan Dugdales Moustache

Well-Known Member
So, RT.com. The Russian keyboard warriors in the comments section are as Jingoistic as we are. A lot of antisemetism as well. They genuinely believe they are winning the Special Operation. Every defeat is part of a cunning plan. The article:

Sergey Poletaev: As winter approaches, both Russia and Ukraine bulk up their forces in preparation for decisive battles
Moscow’s military mobilization means that Kiev is set to lose its vast numerical advantage. How will this play out on the battlefields?
By Sergey Poletaev, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project.
FILE PHOTO. © Wolfgang Schwan / Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
Russia’s failures on the frontlines of its conflict with Ukraine in September were followed by organizational conclusions: A partial mobilization was announced on September 21; on October 8, all Russian forces in Ukraine were united under General Sergey Surovikin; and on October 19, a kind of defense committee headed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin was created and elements of martial law were introduced in a number of western and southern regions.
The effect of these measures, however, has yet to manifest itself, so since early autumn, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have had the initiative on almost the entire front, except in the area of Artyomovsk (Bakhmut) in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), where the Wagner Group’s forces have continued their leisurely offensive.
As we anticipated, in the north of the front, at the junction of Kharkov Region and the DPR, the enemy built upon its September success, and by the start of October, had taken the strategically important town of Krasny Liman, which had fallen under Russian control back in May.
Although the Ukrainian army’s offensive stalled and the Russians managed to counterattack and liberate several settlements afterwards, the event was symbolic. For the first time, not just a major city, but a Russian city was surrendered to the enemy – on the very day after the four new regions were incorporated into our country.

On the Kherson front, after a month of bloody failures, Kiev’s forces eventually unlocked the Russian defenses. The direction of the main strike shifted to the northeast, where a strike was launched on October 2-4 along the Dnieperriverbank, forcing Russian troops to retreat 20-30km to the Dudchany-Davydov Brod line. Again, the same tactics used in Kharkov worked: Taking advantage of the numerical edge and the fact that Moscow did not have a solid front but rather a number of garrisons on the line. The Ukrainians broke through to the rear, flooded the area, and forced a Russian retreat.
For the Ukrainians, this style of attack is a double-edged sword: If successful, it means a very quick breakthrough; but if unsuccessful, it leads to very heavy losses.
Since then, the front has been stabilized, but the position of the Russians here remains vulnerable. All supplies for the group, and the regional center, depend on road transport via the Kakhovskaya Dam, which has been subjected to missile attacks by Kiev on more than one occasion. Temporary military bridges have been erected to replace the broken passes over the sluice, which itself has been backfilled to allow passage, but this does not fully solve the supply problem.
At dawn on October 8, there was a high-profile attack on the Crimean Bridge – a truck bomb was detonated, collapsing one of the two roads, and a parallel train carrying oil products caught fire, damaging one of the railway lines. The surviving lanes were restored to road traffic on the same day, while the rest required major repairs.
With this act of sabotage, as well as his calls for a preemptive nuclear strike, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky gave his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, an excuse to up the ante. Russia responded by launching massive strikes on Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure. This was the first time since the beginning of the military operation that systematic work of this nature was seen. According to various estimates, in less than two weeks of daily attacks, Ukraine’s power grid deteriorated by 10-30%. A strict regime of light saving was introduced across the country, as water supplies, street lighting, and electric transport were cut off to varying degrees. So far, only thermal power plants, their electrical substations, and power grid control rooms have been attacked. Hydropower plants, for example, much less nuclear power plants, have not been targeted.

In addition to Kalibr cruise missiles, Geran-2 kamikaze drones have been widely used in the strikes. They are equipped with a simple piston engine (for which they are nicknamed ‘mopeds’) and use a satellite guidance system. Because of their mass application and the lack of a jet stream at which anti-aircraft missile heads can be aimed, Ukrainian air defence is powerless against the Gerans: it is more often possible to shoot down a drone with small arms as it approaches its target, which, in turn, leads to explosives-laden drones dropping on civilian objects, residential buildings and so on in dense urban areas.
Ukraine has responded by stepping up the shelling of Belgorod Region, also targeting electrical substations. This has caused power outages in Belgorod, which, however, cannot be compared to the blackouts in Ukraine.
In addition, Kiev has started targeting power centers in the new Russian regions– in recent days, facilities in Donetsk and Energodar have been hit.
Western reactions to Moscow’s latest actions have been surprisingly sluggish. In response to the acceptance of new regions into Russia, the partial mobilization, and strikes on the energy sector, Washington only promised to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses to combat Kalibrs and Gerans. Accelerated accession to NATO was not offered, nor was a sharp increase in arms deliveries. Thus, it is clear that the West intends to continue fighting by proxy – at least as long as the offensive potential of the AFU remains.
***
So what’s next? It appears that Kiev is preparing a major offensive on Kherson with the aim of taking both the city itself and the entire right bank part of the region. General Surovikin has openly admitted the gravity of the situation, not ruling out “difficult decisions.” In recent days, Russia has been conducting a hasty evacuation of the right bank, and it appears that the main battle of the autumn is about to begin here.
In addition, we should expect an attack by the AFU in the north, in Svatovo and Rubezhnoye-Severodonetsk. A large Ukrainian grouping has also assembled in the area, and the Russian Armed Forces are actively setting up defensive lines.

Another area under threat is Energodar and the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant. New attempts at landing via the Kakhovka Reservoir and an overland strike via Vasilievka along the southern bank of the Dnieper can be expected here, but the latter does not appear to be realistic at the moment.
Ukraine needs to hurry. Time is working against it. As mobilized troops from Russia arrive at the front, the AFU’s advantage in numbers will come to an end and the tactic of breaking through with light units will no longer work. In addition, in November, the last of the green grass will vanish, snow will fall, and the troops will become more vulnerable from the air.
Russia will apparently continue its strikes on infrastructure while reinforcing the front. The immediate task is to repel an offensive by the AFU, inflicting maximum defensive damage. A joint Russian-Belarusian grouping in Belarus has also been announced. It can hardly be expected to launch an offensive from the north, but instead, its aim is probably to draw in as many Ukrainian forces as possible from the front to cover the border.
Kiev seems to be well aware of the limits of its capabilities, as in recent days, there have been reports of new waves of mobilization in Ukraine. Whether Russia will have to respond in the same manner, or whether the first autumn draft will be enough, we will see in the coming months.
Which side has the will to win is what it boils down to.
 

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