I think I’ve got it.
A is owned equally by B and C. B and C each have the right to veto the sale of the other’s shares to anyone they don’t like. In hard times, C sells its 50% share to D, and as part of the deal C gets a contractual right (with B’s full knowledge) to buy the shares back from D (subject to conditions).
C nearly goes into administration, but is rescued by E. Nobody knows who owns E. At some point, C enters into liquidation, as part of a complex and tedious process by which E extricates itself from any obligations to A (which it would like to own), leaving E with just the bits of C that it wants.
B, D and E spend a couple of years in a three-cornered fight in court. Neither B nor D want to sell their part of A to E, which E thinks is not fair.
B suddenly announces, controversially, that it is selling its 50% share of A to F. D says it wants to sell its 50% share of A to F too. But under the terms of the earlier contract, D gives C thirty days to make an offer for its half of A. E say they own the bit of C which has the rights to buy D’s half of A, but D say that the rights still belong to C. Some people say that even if E (through C) matches F’s offer, B or F might veto the sale of half of A to C (and therefore to E) despite the contract that D previously made with C.
Apparently, G and H also want to buy C (or at least C’s contract with D), so that they too can make a bid for D’s half of A. Some believe that B and/or D might somehow be colluding with G and/or H, whilst others think that E might have had some bizarre arrangement with G (or even F) all along.
And to think that we only used to have the football to entertain us.