USSR invades Ukraine. (6 Viewers)
- Thread starter Alan Dugdales Moustache
- Start date
Terry Gibson's perm
Well-Known Member
Another one of Putins supporters a top tv executive has sadly died this one didn’t fall off a building poisoning what the choice this time.
Flying Fokker
Well-Known Member
skybluetony176
Well-Known Member
It will probably come to nothing but relatives of Russian conscripts are getting organised because the army are refusing to release them at the end of their terms. It’s starting to sound like the mothers of Russian organisations during the Chechnya war when they marched to Chechnya to take their sons home from the frontline.
Grendel
Well-Known Member
D
Deleted member 9744
Guest
It's nonsense of course, but I am afraid the US and UK have lost any moral authority in light of their support for Israel's totally disproportionate actions in Gaza and the West Bank. Aside from the appalling neglect of the plight of Palestinian civilians, the risks to world security arising from this are much more grave than what is happening in Ukraine, disgraceful though that is.
eastwoodsdustman
Well-Known Member
There was an attack on a royal navy ship by the houthi rebels hence the attack on the rebel bases.
D
Deleted member 9744
Guest
You think that was unconnected to our support of the Israelis attacks on Gaza and actions in the West Bank?
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eastwoodsdustman
Well-Known Member
Of course it is. There’s definitely been an escalation in tensions on both sides but as soon as there’s any sort of attack on a royal navy vessel the uk will retaliate.
D
Deleted member 9744
Guest
Of course but then things just get worse, and the risk of a regional war throughout the Middle East and terrorism worldwide increases. Western countries need to learn that bombing poor countries/populations with no concern for the impact on their civilians isn't going to come without consequences.
Balls of steel on the Bradley crew.
Also amazing to see a 40 year old infantry fighting vehicle running rings around a Russian main battle tank.
shmmeee
Well-Known Member
Astounding.
Grendel
Well-Known Member
What is outstanding is how illegal and irresponsible actions under ours and the US flags are somehow more justified than those of nasty men we don’t like very much
shmmeee
Well-Known Member
The reason we don’t like these “nasty men” Grendel is that they preside over violent authoritarian regimes that work against us on a global scale, specifically in Russias case. It’s not because they posted something edgy on Insta.
Grendel
Well-Known Member
There are a lot of people we don’t like. It doesn’t give us any more legitimacy in our tawdry exploits in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya where we trample around and leave someone else to clean up the wreckage - at least Cameron didn’t get his way in Syria
I mean it’s really going well in the Middle East
As for authoritarian regimes we seem pretty happy to flog arms to them when it suits - another pledge I see Slippery Starmer back tracked on yesterday
Isreal has to be included for that to stack up houtis related as a consequence of that, nothing to do with it,bunkum.
shmmeee
Well-Known Member
We do, and I wish we didn’t. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t defend our interests and you don’t get more interesting than a global trade route.
Grendel
Well-Known Member
In the same way of course Mr Putin argues he is defending his countries interests
Grendel
Well-Known Member
This ruling actually could have been made in Soviet Russia - speak up against the states views and we will take away your assets
www.independent.co.uk
Ex-civil servant labelled ‘propagandist for Russia’ loses sanctions legal fight
Graham Phillips was made the subject of an ‘asset freeze’ by the UK Government in July 2022.
www.independent.co.uk
This ruling actually could have been made in Soviet Russia - speak up against the states views and we will take away your assets
Ex-civil servant labelled ‘propagandist for Russia’ loses sanctions legal fight
Graham Phillips was made the subject of an ‘asset freeze’ by the UK Government in July 2022.
skybluetony176
Well-Known Member
I think if you did a poll on the UK population you’d find people who support arming Saudi Arabia in the minority, people who support arming Israel (especially with current events) in the minority, people who think we were right to invade Iraq (especially true of the second time) in a minority, people who think Blair is a war criminal who should be in the Haig if only of the back of the dodgy dossier in the majority. I also think that’s true regardless of if you support aid to Ukraine or not. But the notion that Putin invaded Ukraine or any of the former soviet countries is anything more than imperialism spectacularly misunderstands what and who Putin is. Any other excuse he’s given is pure bullshit.
Grendel
Well-Known Member
It’s The Hague tony
Brighton Sky Blue
Well-Known Member
Good job that Coventry just landed a torpedo contract I suppose
Flying Fokker
Well-Known Member
This guy doesn’t see the contradiction in what he writes. RT.com
By Andrey Sushentsov, program director of the Valdai Club
Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Joe Biden. © Drew Angerer/Getty Images
Relations between Russia and the United States have entered a prolonged phase that can be described as a "long confrontation." If the interactions between Moscow and Washington were still the central process of international life, as was the case during the Cold War, this new phase might be considered temporary. But the Moscow-Washington confrontation is now one of many. More importantly, it is taking place in conditions that occur once every few centuries – a period of global redistribution of power and resource potential.
This process affects our country and the US only in part. Within a few decades, the center of global production and consumption will finally shift to Asia, and the center of world economic gravity will be on the border of India and China. In this context, the long-standing Russian-American confrontation will remain one of the main fault-lines, but certainly not the only one.
Why do I think this confrontation will be protracted? Despite significant resource advantages and strong positions in key areas, the US finds itself in a situation where its pursuers are catching up fast. Washington is faced with an increasingly dense international environment that poses obstacles to previously unfettered American action.
The four US strengths that underpin its offensive strategy are: first, its still-advanced military power; second, its central role in the global financial system, which provides an international settlement infrastructure and a convertible currency; third, its strong position in a number of technological fields; and fourth, its ideology and values platform, which, together with the other three dimensions, provide what can be tentatively called a "pyramid of credibility" for American strategy in the world.
Read more
‘Rusak’, ‘Zhuravl’ and ‘Chaika’: Russian developer discusses new attack and reconnaissance drones
This pyramid exists in the economic and financial spheres as well as in foreign policy. Trust explains the irrational behavior of some European states. Incapable of a balanced analysis of the consequences of their decisions, for example on the Ukraine crisis, they are now forced to ask themselves, as the German magazine Der Spiegel does: "What if the United States has no permanent allies? Western Europeans trusted the logic offered by the United States, they literally 'bought' the proposal. It was that the West would deal Russia a quick defeat, a lot of economic resources would be freed up, and relations with Moscow would be rebuilt on a different platform, more favorable to the EU. The belief was that it would be an effective strategy."
The US has one of the most advanced schools of strategic thought – the European classical school received its greatest impetus in the first half of the 20th century in American universities, research, and expert circles. Analysts such as Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and a few other native Europeans were able to systematically outline their ideas and then integrate them into US foreign policy practice.
This inoculation of European strategic thinking fitted well with the classic American maritime strategy and bore fruit that enabled Washington to achieve its goals in the second half of the 20th century. Now, however, we see that this strategic school is faltering: sober, realistic thinkers are in the minority in the establishment. Is this the result of post-Cold War "giddiness," the feeling that this brief moment of military and political dominance would be endless?
At the end of 2021, in the acute phase of the Ukraine crisis, the US made a big mistake, in my opinion, by deciding to apply a strategy to crush Russia instead of a positional strategy. In world history these have been the two classic military-political variants. The strategy of crushing is always based on significant material, power, and ideological advantages, the possession of the initiative, and belief in the rapid defeat of the opponent. This was the idea of Alexander the Great when he began his campaign: a very advanced army, possession of advanced military technology for the time, the principle of the phalanx developed by the Thebans and then adopted by the Macedonians, with strong cavalry units.
They did not suffer a single defeat during the entire campaign. The main obstacle for the Macedonians was the confrontation with the Greek mercenaries from Athens, who used the classic positional strategy. What is the point of such a plan? It gives up the initiative, allows the other side to act, and relies on the need to mobilize and concentrate resources. It avoids a decisive battle for as long as possible and only engages in it when it is impossible to lose. From this description we can see the typical strategic behavior of Russia in different periods of war.
The US tried to crush our country while not possessing superior resources, and misjudged both its own and its allies' capabilities, in an attempt to achieve its goals – which were to isolate Russia, to stimulate internal protests and undermine support for the government, to create major obstacles on the front line and, as a result, to defeat the country as quickly as possible. Now the confrontation in the military sphere has entered a different phase and the Americans are forced to look for a way out of this situation.
US strategic culture is characterized by a transitional approach to allies, and it is to be expected that at some point the cost of owning ‘the Ukrainian asset’ will be too high for the Americans to continue to benefit from it.
Read more
Sergey Poletaev: Here's why the new British-Ukrainian defense agreement is great news for Russia
The RAND Corporation’s paper Avoiding a Long War, published in January 2023, is very telling in this regard. It explicitly states that the relative benefits of owning the Ukrainian asset have generally already been realized, while the costs of maintaining it continue to rise.
This does not mean that after the conditional end of the Ukraine crisis the US will stop trying to use an offensive strategy of crushing our country. For them, we are a key rival in determining the crucial question of the 21st century: will American hegemony continue, or will the world move towards a more balanced polycentric system? And while few of us expected to find ourselves in a military crisis so soon into the process of resolving this issue, it’s now accelerating developments.
The drama of "hegemony or polycentricity” will not be resolved in Ukraine, because there will be other points of tension in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and eventually the Western Hemisphere, where Russia and the US will be on opposite sides of the barricades.
Our confrontation with the Americans will last for a long time, although we will see certain pauses, which the US will use to propose issues of common interest for discussion. From the experience of the Cold War, we recognize a common responsibility for the survival of mankind, and I consider the risks of nuclear escalation in the confrontation to be relatively low.
Russia's task will be to create a network of relationships with like-minded states, which may even eventually include some from the West. The US strategy is to forcibly extinguish points of strategic autonomy, which Washington succeeded in doing in Western Europe in the first phase of the Ukraine crisis, but that move was one of the last successes in this regard
Andrey Sushentsov: Here’s why Russia and the US are set for a long confrontation
The Ukraine conflict is only the first phase in the new struggle between Moscow and WashingtonBy Andrey Sushentsov, program director of the Valdai Club
Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Joe Biden. © Drew Angerer/Getty Images
Relations between Russia and the United States have entered a prolonged phase that can be described as a "long confrontation." If the interactions between Moscow and Washington were still the central process of international life, as was the case during the Cold War, this new phase might be considered temporary. But the Moscow-Washington confrontation is now one of many. More importantly, it is taking place in conditions that occur once every few centuries – a period of global redistribution of power and resource potential.
This process affects our country and the US only in part. Within a few decades, the center of global production and consumption will finally shift to Asia, and the center of world economic gravity will be on the border of India and China. In this context, the long-standing Russian-American confrontation will remain one of the main fault-lines, but certainly not the only one.
Why do I think this confrontation will be protracted? Despite significant resource advantages and strong positions in key areas, the US finds itself in a situation where its pursuers are catching up fast. Washington is faced with an increasingly dense international environment that poses obstacles to previously unfettered American action.
The four US strengths that underpin its offensive strategy are: first, its still-advanced military power; second, its central role in the global financial system, which provides an international settlement infrastructure and a convertible currency; third, its strong position in a number of technological fields; and fourth, its ideology and values platform, which, together with the other three dimensions, provide what can be tentatively called a "pyramid of credibility" for American strategy in the world.
Read more
‘Rusak’, ‘Zhuravl’ and ‘Chaika’: Russian developer discusses new attack and reconnaissance drones
This pyramid exists in the economic and financial spheres as well as in foreign policy. Trust explains the irrational behavior of some European states. Incapable of a balanced analysis of the consequences of their decisions, for example on the Ukraine crisis, they are now forced to ask themselves, as the German magazine Der Spiegel does: "What if the United States has no permanent allies? Western Europeans trusted the logic offered by the United States, they literally 'bought' the proposal. It was that the West would deal Russia a quick defeat, a lot of economic resources would be freed up, and relations with Moscow would be rebuilt on a different platform, more favorable to the EU. The belief was that it would be an effective strategy."
The US has one of the most advanced schools of strategic thought – the European classical school received its greatest impetus in the first half of the 20th century in American universities, research, and expert circles. Analysts such as Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and a few other native Europeans were able to systematically outline their ideas and then integrate them into US foreign policy practice.
This inoculation of European strategic thinking fitted well with the classic American maritime strategy and bore fruit that enabled Washington to achieve its goals in the second half of the 20th century. Now, however, we see that this strategic school is faltering: sober, realistic thinkers are in the minority in the establishment. Is this the result of post-Cold War "giddiness," the feeling that this brief moment of military and political dominance would be endless?
At the end of 2021, in the acute phase of the Ukraine crisis, the US made a big mistake, in my opinion, by deciding to apply a strategy to crush Russia instead of a positional strategy. In world history these have been the two classic military-political variants. The strategy of crushing is always based on significant material, power, and ideological advantages, the possession of the initiative, and belief in the rapid defeat of the opponent. This was the idea of Alexander the Great when he began his campaign: a very advanced army, possession of advanced military technology for the time, the principle of the phalanx developed by the Thebans and then adopted by the Macedonians, with strong cavalry units.
They did not suffer a single defeat during the entire campaign. The main obstacle for the Macedonians was the confrontation with the Greek mercenaries from Athens, who used the classic positional strategy. What is the point of such a plan? It gives up the initiative, allows the other side to act, and relies on the need to mobilize and concentrate resources. It avoids a decisive battle for as long as possible and only engages in it when it is impossible to lose. From this description we can see the typical strategic behavior of Russia in different periods of war.
The US tried to crush our country while not possessing superior resources, and misjudged both its own and its allies' capabilities, in an attempt to achieve its goals – which were to isolate Russia, to stimulate internal protests and undermine support for the government, to create major obstacles on the front line and, as a result, to defeat the country as quickly as possible. Now the confrontation in the military sphere has entered a different phase and the Americans are forced to look for a way out of this situation.
US strategic culture is characterized by a transitional approach to allies, and it is to be expected that at some point the cost of owning ‘the Ukrainian asset’ will be too high for the Americans to continue to benefit from it.
Read more
Sergey Poletaev: Here's why the new British-Ukrainian defense agreement is great news for Russia
The RAND Corporation’s paper Avoiding a Long War, published in January 2023, is very telling in this regard. It explicitly states that the relative benefits of owning the Ukrainian asset have generally already been realized, while the costs of maintaining it continue to rise.
This does not mean that after the conditional end of the Ukraine crisis the US will stop trying to use an offensive strategy of crushing our country. For them, we are a key rival in determining the crucial question of the 21st century: will American hegemony continue, or will the world move towards a more balanced polycentric system? And while few of us expected to find ourselves in a military crisis so soon into the process of resolving this issue, it’s now accelerating developments.
The drama of "hegemony or polycentricity” will not be resolved in Ukraine, because there will be other points of tension in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and eventually the Western Hemisphere, where Russia and the US will be on opposite sides of the barricades.
Our confrontation with the Americans will last for a long time, although we will see certain pauses, which the US will use to propose issues of common interest for discussion. From the experience of the Cold War, we recognize a common responsibility for the survival of mankind, and I consider the risks of nuclear escalation in the confrontation to be relatively low.
Russia's task will be to create a network of relationships with like-minded states, which may even eventually include some from the West. The US strategy is to forcibly extinguish points of strategic autonomy, which Washington succeeded in doing in Western Europe in the first phase of the Ukraine crisis, but that move was one of the last successes in this regard
clint van damme
Well-Known Member
Have kept off this thread and the Palestinian one for my own sanity but thought those of you who are still on it might find this an interesting read.
Apologies if already posted.
Apologies if already posted.
There's an awful lot of holes in Russia's story about that plane.
Seems certain Ukraine shot it down. What nobody seems to know is whether there were any POWs on there.
Given Russia's conduct and outright lies through this war, particularly when needing to cover up their own failures, my guess is there were not 65 POWs on there.
Seems certain Ukraine shot it down. What nobody seems to know is whether there were any POWs on there.
Given Russia's conduct and outright lies through this war, particularly when needing to cover up their own failures, my guess is there were not 65 POWs on there.
Flying Fokker
Well-Known Member
first 1 hr 30 Concerns war theory and challenges the common narrative concerning how Ukraine conflict arose.
Alan Dugdales Moustache
Well-Known Member
It's clearly a route only used by the US and the UK trade. It's not global at all.
Alan Dugdales Moustache
Well-Known Member
So after 90 odd pages on this ,
just remind me why Putin has invaded. I've forgotten. Genuinely.
Poor little lamb was provoked into it.